Battlefield Update: April 12 – April 30

General Overview

During this period, Russian forces conducted localized offensive operations without the intention of achieving a significant breakthrough or capturing territory. Only in a few sectors have the Russians shown high levels of activity, deploying small assault groups to bypass the Ukrainian army’s defensive positions. The situation on most sections of the front can be considered partially and temporarily stabilized. In certain sections of the front, the Ukrainian army is conducting localized counteroffensive operations and regaining Ukrainian territory. Assessing the actions of the Russian command and analyzing the data, it appears that the Russians are actively restructuring their future offensive campaign, and the lack of activity on the front (in a broader sense beyond the tactical level) is due to the active redeployment of Russian troops.

It is important to note the following factors:

· Another shift in priorities by the Russian high command before the start of an offensive operation;

· Issues with troop manpower;

· Continued destruction of critical targets for the Russian army in the operational depth

Shift in Priorities

In our previous overview of the frontline situation, we described how the Russians once again failed to achieve their objectives and, for the first time in the entire war, significantly scaled back their ambitions regarding launching multiple strikes aimed at encircling and subsequently crushing the Ukrainian defense forces. They also redeployed two marine divisions from Dobropillia to the Hulyai Pole and Oleksandrivka (near Hulyai Pole) sectors to stabilize the situation following the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counteroffensive and restore their troops’ lost positions. Another shift in plans and strike directions is observed. The following movements of Russian troops have been recorded:

- The 35th, 74th, and 55th Motorized Rifle Brigades and the 1438th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 41st Army are shifting their sector of the front from the Pokrovsk direction to the Ocheretyno (Shakhove) direction;

- The 90th Tank Division, the 1444th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 41st Army, and, presumably, the 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade are shifting their sector from the Novopavlivka direction to Pokrovsk (to replace brigades from the 41st Army);

- The 51st Airborne Infantry Regiment of the 106th Airborne Division is moving from the Sumy region to the Ocheretyno sector of the front;

- Several more separate battalions and regiments are moving to the Ocheretino sector of the front

The question remains regarding the advisability of redeploying the 120th and 55th Marine Divisions, as the Eastern Military District could likely stabilize the front on its own, and deploying mobile forces that are well-manned and equipped would be more appropriate in the Ocheretyno direction (if the Russian army does indeed plan to conduct offensive operations there).

The Russian army’s overall plan is not yet fully clear, but it is worth noting a significant increase in the adaptability of the Russian high command to the inability (failure) to conduct offensive operations in a particular sector and, as a result, a shift in the direction of attacks. In short, the Russian army has somewhat “stalled” during its offensive and is actively seeking solutions and new directions (weak points) in the Ukrainian defense.

Troop Recruitment

The Russian command plans to recruit 424,000 personnel in 2026 who will sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense. Implementing this plan will allow Russian leadership to cover losses, reorganize its forces, and create new units and formations without resorting to mobilization.

However, for the fourth consecutive month, the Russian command has been facing difficulties in recruiting new personnel. It should be noted that the first months of the year (January, February, and March) have always been problematic for recruitment, after which the situation typically stabilizes. But data on recruitment indicate that plan fulfillment hovers between 26% and 30% after four months. If this trend continues, by the end of the year, the Russian army will be 15–18% short of meeting its recruitment target. And this does not account for battlefield losses, which are rising. And now they are increasing in operational depth.

Operational depth

On a daily basis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces publish reports on strikes against Russian air defense systems, ammunition depots (including those using drones), ballistic missile storage facilities, and the locations of personnel and logistics. The number of strikes that do not make it into the public domain is significantly higher. On a daily basis, Ukrainian defense forces strike Russian logistics at a depth of 30–50 km. They strike fuel and ammunition depots. All of this is yielding significant results that impact the Russian army’s ability to advance:

· Some Russian divisions have been forced to reduce fuel consumption by 15–20%, which significantly impacts logistics;

· due to the destruction of Russian “Ural” and KamAZ trucks at a depth of 30–50 km, the Russian command has banned convoy movements and requires the use of mobile fire support groups to escort their logistics convoys;

· Relocation of some Russian warehouses to Russian territory;

· Relocation of Russian warehouses more than 100 km deep into Russian territory (quite often this was 60–80 km from the front line)

Analyzing this information and observing how, on most sections of the front, the Russians have significantly reduced their offensive activity, the extent to which their logistics are suffering, and the dominance Ukrainian technology holds over Russian technology, we can assume that the armed forces will conduct offensive operations.

SECTOR ANALYSIS

LYMAN

Russian forces have lost the initiative. They are unable to reach the lines set by the Russian high command. Unable to advance, and due to the actions of the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps, Russian forces find themselves in a somewhat deadlocked situation.

Throughout April, the Russians attempted to conduct offensive operations using small infantry groups equipped with ATVs. On April 15, 2026, the Russians attacked Zelenyi Hai using 8 ATVs, and on April 23, 2026, they deployed 5 ATVs in the direction of Shandryholove. Russian assault groups are actively using the tunnel near Novoplatonivka, where Ukrainian forces thwarted Russian plans and eliminated several dozen Russian assault.

SLOVYANSK

In previous analyses, we noted that the Russians have been most successful on the Slovyansk sector of the front. As of April 30, 2026, the Ukrainian Armed Forces conducted a series of local counterattacks, established fire control over Russian logistics, and halted the Russian advance in this sector.

KOSTYANTYNIVKA-POKROVSK

In our report, we also noted that the Russians were preparing armored vehicles for use on this section of the front. And they did indeed make such attempts:

1. April 18: 1 tank, 5 IFVs, 10 ATVs;

2. April 19: 2 IFVs and 5 ATVs;

3. April 20: 5 AVTs

All attacks were repelled by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the Russians were unable to even leave the Chasiv Yar area as they were detected and destroyed.

No significant changes have occurred in the Pokrovsk-Novopavlivka sector.

HULIAIPOLE

The Huliaipole sector is the most active in terms of the number of assault operations by the Russian army. The Russians are conducting assault operations using small infantry group tactics, which the 55th Marine Division has deemed ineffective; as a result, they plan to begin using armored vehicles to advance more quickly and reduce casualties among assault units. Between April 15 and April 20, 2026, the Russians carried out several attacks using ATVs and IFVs. They were unsuccessful. The armored vehicles, along with tanks, were destroyed. The hottest spots where the Russians are advancing with small infantry groups are Myrne, Zaliznychne, Staroukrainka, and Hirke.

In the Zaporizhzhia region, Ukrainian defense forces are striking a large number of Russian targets. Here are just a few of these strikes:

· 16 Russian trucks were struck overnight at a depth of 50 km;

· A Buk-M3 was struck;

· A radar station for the Buk-M3 was struck;

· The “Kasta” and P-18 radars were struck by drones;

· A “Tornado-S” was destroyed;

· Two tugboats were struck in Berdyansk;

· A warehouse involved in the development of advanced UAVs, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and radio-electronic reconnaissance (RER) equipment was destroyed

The number of strikes is significantly higher, and this has already become routine. The Russian command is unable to do anything to even reduce the number of strikes at such a depth.

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