Battlefield update: March 2026

General Overview

During the first month of spring, the Russian military intensified offensive operations across the front. Initially, these assaults relied on small infantry groups and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). However, by the second half of the month, Russia increased its deployment of tanks and armored vehicles. This surge was supported by intensified artillery fire and employment of drones, facilitated by improving weather conditions. Despite these efforts, the Ukrainian Armed Forces repelled all major assaults. However, Russian forces achieved minor tactical advances in specific sectors by infiltrating gaps between Ukrainian positions.

Ukraine continues to scale strikes at operational depths using domestic long-range drones. These strikes are inflicting unsustainable losses on Russian air defense and radar systems while also degrading ammunition depots and targeting command posts. Notably, Ukrainian forces successfully struck a drone launch site at Donetsk Airport during the preparation of «Geran» and «Gerbera» one-way attack drones.

Russian pickup truck with “Geran” drone in the sights of a Ukrainian FP drone
UMF: https://t.me/usf_army/1709

Sector Analysis

Stepnohirsk–Huliaipole

Russian forces in this sector are actively deploying Molniya fixed-wing first-person-view (FPV) drones against targets identified by intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) assets. Despite constant small-group infantry pressure, larger mechanized assaults failed.

• March 18 (Huliaipole): An assault involving two BTR-80/82A armored personnel carriers was repelled.

• March 28 (Robotyne): A larger combined-arms assault—including two tanks, one Ulan-2 light truck, one BMP-3, and four BTR-82As—was defeated.

Both attempts utilized morning fog for concealment, but Ukrainian forces managed to repel both and destroy all of the armored vehicles. In the Huliaipole area, the situation remains highly dynamic; the UAF is conducting local counter-attacks with armored vehicles, resulting in a fluid frontline.

Russia has transferred reserves from the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 55th Naval Infantry Division, which have regenerated after suffering heavy losses in late 2025. Russia is likely planning to conduct further offensive operations with naval infantry forces in the Nove Zaporizhzhia area. Success in this direction would lead their forces to reach the dominant heights in the Nove Pole area west of the T0401 highway, as planned.

Novopavlivka Direction

Russian forces also conducted several assaults in the areas of responsibility of the Ukrainian 59th Assault and 42nd Mechanized brigades, repeatedly using morning fog as cover. Russia is trying to reach the dominant heights of Prosiana-Chaplyne, north of Pokrovske.

• March 17: Russia’s 6th Tank Regiment conducted an assault with one tank, three BMP-2s, and ten ATVs; all equipment was destroyed or abandoned.

• March 25: Two BMPs and an engineering vehicle from the 6th Tank Regiment attacked Ukrainian positions but were damaged and abandoned.

• March 27: An attempt by three ATVs to enter Novopavlivka was repelled.

• March 28–29: Tanks from the 90th Tank Division engaged Ukrainian positions from indirect (closed) firing positions. One tank was destroyed and another abandoned following UAF drone strikes.

Ukrainian fibre optic cable FPV drone targets a Russian tank from the 90th Tank Division that was firing from an indirect firing position

Hryshyne–Pokrovsk Area

The Russian military is attacking Ukrainian positions with small infantry groups and columns of ATVs. As with elsewhere, Russian infantry groups are also actively trying to infiltrate between Ukrainian positions.

• March 17-25: the Russian military attempted to advance with dozens of ATVs under the cover of fog. This included an attempt to advance west from Pokrovsk towards Serhiivka with 13 ATVs, all of which were destroyed. The Russian army is actively trying to advance from the settlement of Udachne to the north-west with its small infantry groups as well.

Ukrainian units are successfully targeting Russian logistics at depths of 40–45 km beyond the forward line of troops in this direction. Following the blockage of Starlink, Russian forces have pivoted to using WiFi bridges for frontline communications; the Ukrainian military is actively hunting these bridges as well as SKVP radar systems, which Russia uses to identify and target Ukrainian ISR and other UAS.

Destruction of a Russian WiFi-bridge by a Ukrainian FPV

Kostyantynivka Direction

Most Russian offensive operations consisted of 1 or 2 Russian soldiers trying to infiltrate past Ukrainian positions every day. On March 26, Russian forces conducted an assault with two tanks or MT-LB, both of which were destroyed. In April, Russia will likely intensify its offensive operations with more armored vehicles in its assaults conducted by the 70th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Motorized Rifle Division, and 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade. These three units recently inspected their armored vehicles in preparation for future assaults.

In March, Russia’s 3^rd Combined Arms Army’s assault detachments were only manned at 65% of their authorized strength, which is low compared to other armies. Despite the relatively low manning, Russia advanced more rapidly in the Slovyansk direction than almost any other direction. Unfortunately, this was not due to particularly successful actions or advantages by Russian forces; instead, it was a result of internal problems facing the Ukrainian army corps responsible for this direction. Russia is conducting offensive actions with small infantry groups in the direction of Svyato-Pokrovske and Zakitne, crossing the river from the north. Presumably, the Russian military is targeting Rai-Oleksandrivka with the aim of breaking through Ukrainian defenses. Russia also plans to use the so-called «Volunteer Corps» on the left flank of the 3rd Combined Arms Army to launch an offensive operation.

Lyman Direction

• March 19: near Drobysheve-Shandryholove and Ridkodub-Hrekivka, the Russian military launched its largest attack in the Lyman direction since 2024. Russian forces employed more than 100 ATVs, 3 tanks, 5 armored personnel carriers, and 7 infantry fighting vehicles. Russia attempted to break through the defense during the morning fog to capture Drobysheve by assaulting through Shandryholove and from the Ridkodub-Hrekivka direction, areas that Russia’s 144^th Motorized Rifle Division had previously falsely reported as captured. According to Ukraine’s 3^rd Army Corps, 84 of the ATVs and all of the tanks and armored vehicles involved in the assault were destroyed, and 284 Russian soldiers were killed with another 137 wounded. Effective reconnaissance, proper planning, and mining the terrain and likely avenues of approach played a key role in repelling Russia’s assault.

• March 26: Russian forces attempted to advance with 8 ATVs in the direction of Shandryholove, but all were destroyed.

• March 27: Russian forces attacked in the area of Karpivka with 6 ATVs and one BMP-2 under the cover of fog. All of the vehicles were destroyed.

• March 27-29: Units from Ukraine’s 3^rd Army Corps inflicted significant damage on Russian logistics at a depth of up to 30 kilometers past the forward line of troops, including dozens of ATVs, company and battalion ammunition depots, and several BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems.

Presumably, the Russian army will not abandon its plans to capture those settlements (the main focus might be on Borova village). An inspection of armored vehicles and ATVs is being conducted.

Destruction of the Russian assault groups from March 19th.

https://t.me/ab3army/6806

Russian TMM-3 bridgelayer on fire near Lyman

Observations & Conclusions

• Ukrainian UAS battalions and regiments subordinate to army corps are acquiring middle strike capabilities, enabling them to strike targets at operational depth.

• The number of successful Ukrainian strikes on ammunition depots, logistics storage facilities, and air defense systems is increasing

• Russian forces expanded their use of armored vehicles and ATVs in assaults in the second half of the month.

• Russian forces deliberately time their assaults when there is fog and overcast weather conditions.

• Russia will likely prioritize offensive operations in the Slovyansk and Huliaipole directions in April.

• In some directions, Ukrainian units are potentially setting the conditions for future tactical offensive operations by disrupting Russian logistics and targeting UAS crews. This could lead to additional offensive operations before the end of the spring.

• Russian forces are employing uncrewed ground vehicles (UGV) less frequently near the front line, most likely due to the loss of access to Starlink. Instead, they have to rely on different communications systems, which limit their range.

• In some key directions, Russian armies maintain a high level of manning in their assault detachments from 75-80% of authorized strength.

• Russia has deployed a significant number of observation posts to counter Ukrainian UAS.

Abandoned BMP-3 at Lyman direction

Note about the maps. The character of the fighting typically involves small groups of Russian soldiers who infiltrate past the Ukrainian zero line. In many places, there is a near-constant presence of Russian soldiers past the forward line of Ukrainian infantry positions. However, this presence does not necessarily mean Russia controls this territory. Many mappers instead prefer to use grey zone to mark areas that neither side actually controls. The character of the fighting is simply more difficult to map properly than during previous periods of the war, and observers should recognize this limitation. The maps in this report use data from Geoconfirmed to show the approximate location of the line of contact, but this should be understood as approximate and not exact.

More information about maps from Geoconfirmed:

https://geoconfirmed.org/